NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 21 | Number 1

Article 23

12-1-1942

Administrative Law -- Announcement of Policy as
Constituting Order Subject to Judicial Review
Wallace C. Murchison

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Wallace C. Murchison, Administrative Law -- Announcement of Policy as Constituting Order Subject to Judicial Review, 21 N.C. L. Rev. 68
(1942).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol21/iss1/23

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

[Vol. 21

NOTES AND COMMENTS*
Administrative Law-Announcement of Policy as Constituting
Order Subject to Judicial Review
Through its contracts with 115 affiliated radio stations, the Columbia
Broadcasting System maintains the national network organization necessary to secure advertising revenues. Following a prolonged investigation the Federal Communications Commission concluded that certain
provisions of these contracts were unduly restrictive of competition.
Accordingly, an order was issued giving expression, in the form of
"chain broadcasting regulations," to the general policy which the Commission would follow in future licensing of broadcasting stations. The
regulations provided that no license should be granted to a station whose
contract with a network system contained any of the prohibited arrangements. Immediately many of the local affiliates announced their intention to cancel, modify, or refuse to renew their existing contracts.
CBS brought suit under the Communications Act of 1934 and the
Urgent Deficiencies Act1 to enjoin enforcement of the FCC's order as
beyond the Commission's statutory and constitutional authority and
contrary to public policy. The special three-judge district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 2 but upon direct appeal to the Supreme
Court the lower court was reversed and the case remanded for trial
on the merits.3 By a five to three decision the Court held the order reviewable because it promulgated regulations controlling the contractual
relationships of the stations and the networks, thereby immediately and
adversely affecting the rights of the appellant, and subjecting the stations to a drastic penalty for non-compliance-denial or cancellation of
broadcasting licenses.
Several aspects of the broad problem of judicial review of administrative orders are not under consideration here. Under the doctrine
of "primary jurisdiction" courts refuse to deal with technical questions
* Footnotes which contain material other than a mere listing of sources and
authorities are indicated throughout this REvIEw by an asterisk placed after the
footnote number.
'§402(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1093 (1934), 47 U. S.
C. A. §402(a) (Supp. 1941), makes applicable to "suits to enforce, enjoin, set
aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Commission" (with the exception of
orders granting or denying construction permits and radio station licenses) the
provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act outlining the procedure for review of
ICC orders. 38 STAT. 219 (1913), 28 U. S. C. A. §46 (1934).
2 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 688 (S. D. N. Y.
1942).
' Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct.
National Broadcasting Company v.
1194, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1066 (1942).
United States, - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 1214, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1088 (1942), is
a companion case.
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until they have been submitted to the specialized administrative body
designed for expertness in handling such problems. 4 Administrative
remedies must be exhausted before the case can be taken to the courts.5
For example, judicial review has been denied where there was no application for a rehearing before the administrative tribunal,0 and in some
cases where appeal to a higher governmental agency has been provided,7
such appeal has been held a prerequisite to judicial consideration.
Suits to set aside or modify administrative orders may be maintained
only by aggrieved or interested parties,8 and these actions are bften
These problems, and the
limited to 'definite statutory procedures."
crucial issue of the conclusiveness of administrative determinations
(the doctrine of administrative finality), may be differentiated from
the first essential of appeal from administrative action, the requirement
illustrated in the principal case, -namely, that there be an "order" having a degree of finality and determining or affecting the legal rights,
duties and responsibilities of the appellant.
"The word 'order' is used for an executive act, for a judicial act,
'Texas & P. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51
L. ed. 553 (1907) ; Miller, The Necessity for PreliminaryResort to the Interstate
Commerce Commission (1932) 1 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 49; Tollefson, Judicial
Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1937)
WASH. L. REv. 503, 531; Note (1938) 51 H.Av. L. REv. 1251.
'Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (1939) 48 YALE L.
Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort to
istrative Remedies (1930) 28 MIcH. L. Rv.637; Notes (1935) 35 COL.
230, (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 450.

5 GEo.

J.981;
AdminL. Rv.

'Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F. (2d) 282 (App. D. C. 1938),
cert. denied, 305 U. S. 625, 59 S. Ct. 86, 83 L. ed. 400 (1938) ; Note (1939) 27
GEo. L. J.783.
'Porter v.Investor's Syndicate, 286 U. S.461, 52 S.Ct. 617, 76 L. ed. 1226
(1931) ; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S.210, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L. ed.
150 (1908) ; United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S.161, 24 S.Ct. 621, 48 L. ed.
'917 (1904); §313(a) of the Federal Power Act, 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U. S.
C. A. §8251(a) (1941).
'FCC v.Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S.470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L. ed.
869 (1940); Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S.382; 52
S. Ct. 440, 76 L. ed. 808 (1932) ; Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281
U. S.249, 50 S.Ct. 315, 74 L. ed. 832 (1930) ; Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S.
258, 44 S.Ct. 317, 68 L. ed. 667 (1924) ; Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v.
United States, 263 U. S.143, 44 S.Ct. 72, 68 L. ed. 216 (1923).
"The two most common methods of review found in Congressional acts are
(1) an equitable proceeding to enjoin or set aside the order, brought in a special
district court of three judges, with direct appeal as of right to the Supreme Court,
and precedence over other cases in both courts (the procedure provided by the
Urgent Deficiencies Act) ; (2) an appeal to a circuit court of appeals by the commission to enforce, or by an interested party to set aside, a cease and desist order
of the commission, with review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari.
McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders (1940)

28 CAsIFn. L. Rlv. 129, 130. For cases denying relief because the wrong procedure
was followed, see Venner v. Michigan C. R. R., 271 U. S.127, 46 St. Ct. 444,
70 L. ed. 868 (1926); Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. L,258 U. S.
377, 42 S.Ct. 349, 66 L. ed. 671 (1922) ; United States v. Merchants and Manufacturers' Traffic Ass'n, 242 U. S.178, 37 S.Ct. 24, 61 L. ed. 233 (1916).
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and for a legislative act. . ."10 There is nothing in the usage of the
term which clarifies the problem of what acts are "orders" and therefore reviewable. Nor have the statutes creating administrative boards
and establishing their relationship to the judiciary attempted any more
accurate definition or classification. 1 Consequently, courts have been
relatively free to block out the kind of determinations properly called
"orders" and to place limitations on the appealability of these orders. 12
An "order" in the form of an unequivocal command is often required as a condition precedent to judicial review. Although this
condition has not been universally demanded, 13 it does explain why
administrative determinations in the nature of findings of fact embodied
in reports and orders are not subject to attack as such. 14" This is true
whether the findings are the last contemplated action in the proceedings
or whether they are to be the basis for future administrative adjudication or regulation; standing alone they are not enforceable and seldom
have any immediate legal effects. United States v. Los Angeles &
Salt Lake Railroad Company,' 5 relied on by Justice Frankfurter in his
Committee on Ministers' Powers, Report (Cmd. 4060, London, 1932) 18.
"' For a thorough classification, see Blachly and Oatman, Federal Statutory
Administrative Orders (1940) 25 IowA L. Rav. 582.
12Note, Appealability of Administrative Orders (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766,
768. This comment contains an excellent discussion of the general problem under
consideration.
1
Note (1940) 8 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 113, 114.
4* United States v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. R., 282 U. S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 237, 75
L. ed. 513 (1931) (in report on carrier's accounts, ICC concluded that investment
10

figure should not exceed stated sum and "expected" company to adjust accounts
accordingly; held, no "order") ; Carolina Aluminum Co. v. Federal Power Comm.,
97 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (no review of finding that interstate or
foreign commerce would be affected by proposed construction of hydro-electric
power project, even though after such finding construction of the project would
violate the Federal Power Act and could be enjoined at the suit of the Commission); Third Ave. Ry. v. SEC, 85 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) (carrier
asked SEC to amend requirements as to filing financial statements, and was notified by letter that its petition was denied; the court dismissed the statutory
appeal) ; Brady v. ICC, 43 F. (2d) 847 (N. D. W. Va. 1930), aff'd, 283 U. S.
804, 51 S. Ct. 559, 75 L. ed. 1424 (1931) (suit to set aside reparation order held
not maintainable under Urgent Deficiencies Act because suit was actually one to
correct alleged errors in ICC's findings on which the order was based) ; Brooklyn
E. Distr. Terminal v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 634 (S. D. N. Y. 1927) (general
order of ICC required common carriers to report excess income and pay half to
the Commission; the Commission declared petitioner a common carrier and by
letters "requested" payment; held, no appealable order) ; cf. Great N. Ry. v.
United States, 277 U. S. 172, 48 S. Ct. 466, 72 L. ed. 838 (1928) (no appeal
from certification by ICC of amount due carrier under government guaranty).
See also Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Merriam & Millard Co., 297 Fed. 1 (C. C A.
8th, 1924) (ICC report that certain rates would be unreasonable for the future
and that reductions by the railroads should be forthcoming was held ineffectual
to change existing filed tariffs); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Delaware,
L. & W. R. R., 207 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1913) (without formal order the
ICC declared that allowances given by carriers were unlawful rebates and announced that carriers were expected to revise tariffs in conformity with the
declaration; held ICC's action does not constitute a legally significant order).
Accord, United States
1 273 U. S. 299, 47 S. Ct. 413, 71 L. ed. 651 (1927).
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dissenting opinion in the instant case, presents a typical application
16
of this rule. Under the authority of the Valuation Act, the Interstate
Commerce Commission established a final value of the railroad's property. This valuation was for possible future use by the Commission in
any of a number of regulatory activities, notably rate making. In a
suit to set aside the ICC's order fixing the value it was held that the
order was not reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. It did not
command, nor did it determine any legal right; and since under the
Act it was only prima facie evidence of the legal value, it could be re17
examined in any later judicial proceedings involving the valuation. *
Similar to these "non-orders" are jurisdictional findings of boards
and commissions. Such agencies must necessarily make the initial
determination of whether individuals and corporations are subject to
the provisions of the statutes sought to be enforced or whether they
fall within exemptions or exceptions. Efforts to attain immediate court
review of these decisions have generally been unsuccessful, even though
direct and serious injury threatens. This is one aspect of the "final
order rule,"' 8 the doctrine which denies appeals until the final stage
of the administrative process has been reached. 19 A determination
that a carrier is not an interurban electric railway within an exception
to the Railway Labor Act,20 or the Interstate Commerce Act ;21- that
v. Kansas City S. Ry., 275 U. S. 500, 48 S. Ct. 140, 72 L. ed. 394 (1927).

Potomac Edison Co. v. West, 165 Md. 462, 169 Atl. 480 (1933).

Contra:

In Delaware &

Hudson Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 438, 45 S. Ct. 153, 69 L. ed. 369 (1925),
a suit to annul a tentative valuation of railroad property was dismissed because
the administrative process had not been completed, the administrative remedy
exhausted.
1637 STAT. 701 (1913), 49 U. S. C. A. §19a (1934).
""The following language of Justice Brandeis, distinguishing this order from
quasi-judicial and legislative orders of administrative agencies, was quoted in the
dissenting opinion of the principal case: "The so-called order . . . is one which
does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing anything; which
does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege or license; . . . extend or
abridge any power or facility; . . . subject the carrier to any liability, civil or
criminal; . . . change the carrier's existing or future status or condition; . . .
determine any right or obligation. . . . It is the exercise solely of the function
of investigation . . . merely preparation for possible action in some proceeding
which may be instituted in the future- ... ." United States v. Los Angeles &
S. L. R. R., 273 U. S. 299, 309, 47 S. Ct. 413, 414, 71 L. ed. 651, 655 (1927).
18 Note (1940) 8 U. oF CHi. L. REv. 113.
' Of course, all intermediate determinations may be questioned when the final
order is attacked. For example, United States v. Idaho, 298 U. S. 105, 56 S. Ct.
690, 80 L. ed. 1070 (1936). When the ICC, after deciding that a railroad line
was not a spur track outside the Commission's statutory jurisdiction, authorized
abandonment of the line, the State of Idaho sued under the Urgent Deficiencies
Act, contending that the line vas a spur and the ICC's authorization of abandonment ineffective. Held, the line is a spur track wholly within one state and Commission's order is annulled.
20* §1 of the Railway Labor Act, 48 STAT. 1185 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. §151
(Supp. 1941), authorizes and directs the ICC, upon request of the National Mediation Board or any interested party, to determine whether an electric railway falls
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the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 193522 applies to a corporation seeking exemption ;28 that a distributor is a "natural gas company" under the Natural Gas Act ;24 or that an employer is engaged
in interstate commerce and is therefore within the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board 25-these are not appealable orders.
But in a recent case the Supreme Court held reviewable an FCC
ruling that a telephone company was a common carrier within the
Communications Act of 1934,26 and therefore subject to pasLorders of
the Commission relating to telephone companies.2 7 The distinction
between this case and others which involve jurisdictional determinawithin the exception. Pursuant to this provision and at the request of the Mediation Board the Commission found that a carrier was not an interurban electric
railway. Held, the finding is not an order reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies
Act because it is not in the form of an order, it does not command or direct any
action but is simply preparation for possible future intervention in case of a labor
dispute. Shannahan v. United States, 303 U. S. 596, 58 S. Ct. 732, 82 L. ed. 1039
(1938). The Court expressly declined to consider whether the ICC's determination was reviewable by some procedure other than that of the Urgent Deficiencies
Act. In Shields v. Utah Idaho C. R. R., 305 U. S. 177, 59 S. Ct. 160, 83 L. ed.
111 (1938) one method of appeal was approved. After the ICC found the railroad within the scope of the Act and the National Mediation Board ordered the
posting of a notice, the carrier brought suit against the federal district attorney
to restrain any prosecution for failure to publish the notice or for any other
violation of the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's assumption
of jurisdiction. Other examples of review by this method: Texas Electric Ry.
v. Eastus, 25 F. Supp. 825 (N. D. Tex. 1938), aff'd, 308 U. S. 512, 60 S. Ct.
134, 84 L. ed. 437 (1939), and Hudson & Manhattan R. R. v. Hardy, 22 F. Supp.
105 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), rev'd on merits, 103 F. (2d) 327 (C. C. A. Zd, 1939).
2
Piedmont & N. Ry. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469, 50 S. Ct. 192, 74 L. ed.
551 (1930).
The ICC decided that the carrier was not exempt from the Act
and that public convenience and necessity did not permit a proposed extension of
the railway's lines. The carrier sued to set aside the order denying exemption;
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction,
saying that the ICCs negative order was not res judicata of the company's claim
of immunity, and that the risk of loss to the carrier if it constructed the line
without a certificate arose from the statute, not from the order. The validity of
the ICC's determination of the railway's status was later tested and sustalped by
a suit to enjoin the construction of the new line until a certificate should be obtained. Piedmont & N. Ry. v. ICC, 286 U. S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 541, 76 L. ed. 1115
(1932). United States v. Chicago, N. S. & M. R. R., 288 U. S. 1, 53 S. Ct. 245,
77 L. ed. 583 (1933) was a proceeding to enjoin the carrier from issuing securities
without ICC approval. The district court and the Supreme Court declared the
railroad within the exemption to the Act, pointing out that the Commission had
for over a decade treated the carrier as an interurban electric railway outside
its jurisdiction.
2149 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. §79 et seq. (Supp. 1941).
Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. SEC, 100 F. (2d) 5 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
2
East Ohio Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 115 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A.
6th, 1940) ; Canadian River Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 110 F. (2d) 350
(C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
" See Newport News S. & D. D. Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U. S. 54, 57, 58 S. Ct.
466, 467, 82 L. ed. 646, 648, 649 (1938).
2
" §2(b) (2) of the Act, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. 152(b) (2)
(Supp. 1941); §3(h), 48 STAT. 1065 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. §153(h) (Supp.
1941).
27 Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 59 S. Ct. 754,
83 L. ed. 1147 (1939).
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tions is found in the opinion by Justice Frankfurter: "The order . ; .
was not a mere abstract declaration regarding the status of the Rochester.... [It] necessarily and immediately carried direction of obedience
to previously formulated mandatory orders addressed generally to all
2
carriers amenable to the Commission's authority." 8There is a stronger reason, however, for the importance of the
Rochester Telephone Corp. case in the field of administrative law. In
it the Supreme Court repudiated the "negative order doctrine." A
long line of decisions in suits under the Urgent Deficiencies Act to set
aside ICC orders had established the questionable proposition that the
federal courts had no jurisdiction to review orders denying the affirmative relief sought.29 When re-examined by the Court the cases failed
to sustain the utility and wisdom of the doctrine and they were over28 Id. at 143, 144, 59 S. Ct. at 764, 83 L. ed. at 1160. A case somewhat
resembling the Rochester Telephone Corp. case is Charles Noeding Trucking Co.
v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 537 (D. N. J.1939). §203(b) (8) of the Motor
Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 544 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. §303(b) (8) (Supp. 1941),
grants to carriers within municipalities, between contiguous municipalities, or within
commercial zones adjacent to municipalities a partial exemption from the provisions of the Act, but the ICC may withdraw the exemption and apply the full
Act when necessary to carry out the national transportation policy. The Commission defined the New York City commercial zone, excluding and withdrawing
from the zone certain contiguous municipalities, thus subjecting carriers in those
areas to the regulatory weight of the Act, backed up by penal provisions. On
attack by the carriers the ICC's determination was held a "final order" reviewable
under the terms of the Act; the order ended the proceeding before the ICC and
imposed duties on the plaintiffs which carried sanctions for non-compliance.
"Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, 32 S. Ct. 761, 56
L. ed. 1091 (1912) (refusal of relief against demurrage regulations); Hooker v.
Knapp, 225 U. S.302, 32 S. Ct. 769, 56 L. ed. 1099 (1912) (refusal to reduce
maximum rates) ; Lehigh Valley R. R. v. United States, 243 U. S.412, 37 S.Ct.
397, 61 L. ed. 819 (1917) (denial of relief from Panama Canal Act) ; Manufacturers Ry. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 38 S. Ct. 383, 62 L. ed. 831 (1918)
(failure to fix divisions of joint rates); Piedmont & N. Ry. v. United States,
280 U. S. 469, 50 S. Ct. 192, 74 L. ed. 551 (1930) (assumption of jurisdiction
and denial of certificate of convenience and necessity); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 283 U. S.235, 51 S. Ct. 429, 75 L. ed. 999 (1931) (denial of relief

against alleged overcharges) ; ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U. S. 385,
53 S.Ct. 607, 77 L. ed. 1273 (1933) (refusal to award damages in reparations
case); United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435, 56 S. Ct. 829, 80 L. ed. 1263
(1936) (refusal to file tariff schedule) ; United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S.226,
58 S. Ct. 601, 82 L. ed. 764 (1938) (refusal upon re-examination to increase

railroad's compensation for carrying the mail). But cf. holding order reviewable: Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 34 S. Ct. 986, 58 L. ed. 1408
(1914) (partial denial of permission to depart from the short and long haul
clause of the Interstate Commerce Act); United States v. New River Co., 265
U. S. 533, 44 S. Ct. 610, 68 L. ed. 1165 (1924) (dismissal of complaints against
rule of coal car distribution); Alton R. R. v. United States, 287 U. S. 229, 53
S. Ct. 124, 77 L. ed. 275 (1932) (refusal to change divisions of joint reshipping
rates); Powell v. United States, 300 U. S. 276, 5(/S. Ct. 470, 81 L. ed. 643
(1937) (order striking tariff from files). On the negative order doctrine and its
abolition in the Rochester Telephone Corp. case, see Notes (1934) 34 COL. L. REv.
908, (1939) 15 IND. L. J.151, (1940)" 24 MiNN. L. REv. 379, (1939) 6 U. OF
CHr. L. REv. 277, (1939) 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 591; (1933) 1 GEo. WAsH. L.
Rav. 276.
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ruled. The combined doctrines of "primary jurisdiction" and "administrative finality" were left to effectuate the considerations of policy
behind the abandoned negative order rule. 0
In contrast to administrative -determinations which are not enforceable and which do not give rise to a clash of interest between a complainant and a governmental agency are regulations which are the end
results of a commission's investigation and which formulate definite
rules of conduct, enforceable by the imposition of statutory penalties.
Thus a person aggrieved by a rate order,3 ' a rule of car distribution in
times of shortage,32 an order promulgating rules governing car-hire
settlements,83 a mandate compelling the adoption of a safety device, 4
or an order prescribing the form and classification of accounts8 5 may
bring an action to enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend the order. These
regulations may adversely affect rights as clearly as the acts of a legislature. Since suits to enjoin the enforcement of statutes have been
Completing the repudiation of the negative order doctrine are two cases
decided at the same term. In United States v. Maher, 307 U. S.148, 59 S. Ct.
768, 83 L. ed. 1162 (1939), the Supreme Court reviewed an order of the ICC
denying an application for a certificate of convenience and necessity under the
"grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U. S.
C. A. §306(a) (Supp. 1941). In Federal Power Comm. v. Pacific Power &
Light Co., 307 U. S. 156, 59 S.Ct. 766, 83 L. ed. 1180 (1939), denial of an
application for transfer of a utility's assets was appealed by the procedure outlined in §313(b) of the Federal Power Act. 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U. S. C. A.
§8251(b) (1941), and the Court sustained the lower court's assumption of jurisdiction. This decision in effect overrules Newport Electric Corp. v. Federal
Power Comm., 97 F. (2d) 580 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
"1Acker v. United States, 298 U. S.426, 56 S.Ct. 824, 80 L. ed. 1257 (1936);
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S.420, 50 S.Ct. 220, 74 L. ed.
524 (1930); United States v. Illinois C. R. R., 263 U. S.515, 44 S.Ct. 189, 68
L. ed. 417 (1924) ; Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 34 S.Ct. 986, 58 L.
ed. 1408 (1914); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 232 U. S.199, 34
S. Ct. 291, 58 L. ed. 568 (1914) ; ICC v. Union Pacific R. R., 222 U. S.541, 32
S. Ct. 108, 56 L. ed. 308 (1912); McLean Lumber Co., v. United States, 237
Fed. 460 (E. D. Tenn. 1916). But cf. Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States,
11 F. Supp. 487 (E. D. Va. 1935).
2Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564, 47 S.Ct. 727, 71 L. ed. 1204 (1927);
ICC v. Illinois C. R. R., 215 U. S.452, 30 S.Ct. 155, 54 L. ed. 280 (1910); cf.
United States v. New River Co., 265 U. S.533, 44 S.Ct. 610, 68 L. ed. 1165
(1924).

"Chicago,

R. I. & P. Ry. v. United States, 284 U. S.80, 52 S.Ct. 87, 76

L.ed. 177 (1931).

"United States v.Baltimore & 0. R.R., 293 U. S.454, 55 S.Ct. 268, 79 L.
ed. 587 (1935).
" General order: American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.United States, 299
U. S.232, 57 S.Ct. 170, 81 L. ed. 142 (1936); Kansas City S. Ry. v. United

States, 231 U. S.423, 34 S.Ct.- 125, 58 L. ed. 296 (1913); New York Edison

Co. v.Maltbie, 271 N. Y. 103, 2 N. E. (2d) 277 (1936). Order applicable to
particular company: Atlanta, B. & C. R. R. v.United States, 296 U. S. 33, 56
S. Ct. 12, 80 L. ed. 25 (1935) ; Norfolk & W. Ry. v.United States, 287 U. S.
134, 53 S.Ct. 52, 76 L. ed. 218 (1932), aff'g 52 F. (2d) 967 (W. D. Va. 1931) ;
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.United States, 5 F. Supp. 7 (D. Va. 1933); Atlanta,
B. & C.R. R. v.United States, 28 F. (2d) 885 (N. D. Ga. 1928).
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allowed36 it is reasonable that a commission's quasi-legislation should
be subject to the same attack in the courts.
There are many orders issued by administrative agencies which,
though unequivocal and imperative, are nevertheless non-appealable.
Recognizing the integrity, responsibility and necessities of the "fourth
branch of Government," courts have been reluctant to interfere with
the administrative process by reviewing procedural, interlocutory orders.
Thus when a federal commission orders the institution of an investigation,37 the holding of a hearing,38 or the production of information
and evidence3 9 the "final order rule" precludes attack until a later
stage in the proceedings has been reached. Similarly, there is no review when the Securities and Exchange Commission refuses permission
to withdraw registration statements, 40 nor when the NLRB directs an
election to determine labor representation. 41 Apparently, however, an
administrative agency's disclosure of confidential information in the
initial stages of the price-fixing process may be enjoined in a proper
42
case. *
The final order doctrine has been specifically incorporated into the
"Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. ed. 1070
(1925)
; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7, 60 L. ed. 131 (1915).
"1 East Ohio Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 115 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A.
6th, 1940); Canadian River Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 110 F. (2d) 350
(C. C. A. 10th, 1940); SEC v. Andrews, 88 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937);
Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Comm., 280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
"' Newport News S. & D. D. Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U. S. 54, 58 S. Ct. 466,
82 L. ed. 646 (1938) ; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58
S. Ct. 459, 82 L. ed. 638 (1938) ; New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. United States, 273
U. S. 652, 47 S. Ct. 334, 71 L. ed. 823 (1927), aff'g 14 F. (2d) 850 (S. D. N. Y.
1926); United States v. Illinois C. R. R., 244 U. S. 82, 37 S. Ct. 584, 61 L. ed.
1007 (1917) ; United States ex rel. Delaware & Hudson R. R. v. ICC, 51 F. (2d)
429 (App. D. C. 1931); Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. ICC, 280 Fed. 1014 (App.
D. C. 1922) ; Philadelphia City Passenger Ry. v. Public Service Comm., 271 Pa.
39, 114 Atl. 642 (1921).
" Fedeeal Power Comm. v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375, 58 S. Ct.
963, 82 L. ed. 1408 (1938); Federal Trade Comm. v. Claire Furnace Co., 274
U. S. 160, 47 S. Ct. 553, 71 L. ed. 978 (1927) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Maynard
Coal Co., 22 F. (2d) 873 (App. D. C. 1927).
" Resources Corp. International v. SEC, 97 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938);
Jones v. SEC, 79 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. dented, 297 U. S. 705,
56 S. Ct. 497, 80 L. ed. 993 (1936).
" NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U. S. 453, 60 S. Ct. 307, 84 L. ed. 396 (1940);
NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 308 U. S. 413, 60
S. Ct. 306, 84 L. ed. 354 (1940); Ames Baldwin Wyoming Co. v. NLRB, 73 F.
(2d) 489 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
"* Review of a general order directing the disclosure of confidential information was denied where the suit was brought under the statutory procedure. Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm., 99 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C.
1938). But in Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm., 306 U. S.
56, 59 S. Ct. 409, 83 L. ed. 483 (1939), the Supreme Court permitted the order
involved in the Mallory case to be tested in a suit to enjoin enforcement; and in
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F. (2d) 236 (App. D. C. 1937)
denial of an application for confidential treatment was held reviewable by the
statutory method because the denial was a final order entered in a particular case.
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National Labor Relations Act by the provision for review of "final
orders" only.43 A certification by the NLRB determining an appropriate bargaining unit and designating a particular union as exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit4 4 was held not a final order
and therefore not reviewable in American Federation of Labor v.
NLRB. 45 The holding rests squarely on construction of the Act in the
light of its wording and history. The clear Congressional intent to bar
46
appeals at this interlocutory stage controlled the decision.
Obviously, the NLRB's certification may have marked adverse
effects upon the rights and duties of the employer and any labor
minority. In recognizing this aspect of the Board's action the Court
significantly remarked: ". . . we attribute little importance to the fact
that the certification does not itself command action. Administrative
determinations which are not commands may for all practical purposes
determine rights as effectively as the judgment of a court, and may be
re-examined by courts under particular statutes providing for the review of 'orders.' ,7*
The primary requisites of judicial review are present in the principal
case, Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. United States.43 The Supreme Court is not deterred by the FCC's characterization of its order as
an announcement of policy. 49 The chain broadcasting regulations, while
in form mere rules to guide the Commission in the exercise of its
" §10(f) : "Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or
denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order
49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A.
in any circuit court of appeals... ."
§160(f) (1942).
"'§9 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A.
§159 (1942), provides for determination of the appropriate unit and selection of
representatives.
"308 U. S. 401, 60 S. Ct. 300, 84 L. ed. 347 (1940).
"Appeal from a similar certification of a state labor relations board has been
denied. Walach's, Inc. v. Boland, 277 N. Y. 345, 14 N. E. (2d) 381 (1938).
"'American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U. S. 401, 408, 60 S. Ct.
300, 303, 84 L. ed. 347, 352 (1940). The Court declined to decide whether a suit
in equity in a district court to set aside the certification was maintainable. Of
course, the employer can attack the validity of the Board's determination of the
appropriate unit and its designation of the majority union by refusing to bargain;
on appeal from the Board's order to bargain collectively the record of the investigation is filed and the certification may be questioned and reviewed. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146, 61 S. Ct. 908, 85 L. ed. 1251
(1941). But if the employer acquiesces in the Board's certification there seems
to be no way in which a minority union can contest it. For comment on American
Federation of Labor v. N.L.R.B., supra, see (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rzv. 1171, (1940)
24 MINN. L. REv. 856, (1939) 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. Riw. 109.
48
U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 1194, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1066 (1942).
"Jurisdiction to review orders of administrative tribunals is not dependent
on their form. See American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U. S. 401, 408,
60 S. Ct. 300, 303, 84 L. ed. 347, 352 (1940) ; Powell v. United States, 300 U. S.
276, 285, 57 S. Ct. 470, 475, 81 L. ed. 643, 650 (1937); Alton R. R. v. United
States, 287 U. S. 229, 237, 53 S. Ct. 124, 127, 77 L. ed. 275, 281 (1932) ; Diamond
Tank Transport v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 497, 499 (W. D. Wash. 1938).
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licensing power, are in effect and intent regulations of the contractual
relations of the national networks and their affiliated stations. 50*
Realistically viewed, the order commands the local stations to abrogate
certain provisions of their contracts or else suffer economic death
through loss of station licenses. Of course, this severe penalty will not
be imposed if the stations can prove that the FCC's expressed concept
of the public convenience, interest and necessity in chain broadcasting
is an erroneous one and the regulations therefore void. But any interested party would have the same opportunity to avoid the fines levied
for disobedience of FCC accounting regulations, or other general orders
which are clearly reviewable. There is no essential difference between
the order in the principal case and other legislative orders reviewable
under the Urgent Deficiencies Act.5 ' In all these cases the alternatives
are to conform to the regulation, to attack it before its direct application to the particular litigant, or to violate it and then defend in the
proceedings brought to attach its sanctions. And there is no question
but that the appellant here is an aggrieved party with standing to assail
the order as an illegal exercise of the Commission's rule-making
52
power.
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, the order adversely
affects the substantive rights of CBS, not contingently upon future
administrative action as in United States v.Los Angeles & Salt Lake
Railroad Company,53 but immediately, as the threatened cancellations
of contracts attest. The FCC has decided that the contract provisions
are contrary to the public interest. It has issued an order which emo* This is shown in several ways. In the first place, the FCC's investigation
was begun under §303(i) of the Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), 47
U. S. C. A. §303(i) (Supp. 1941), which gives the Commission authority "to
make special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting." Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, - U. S. -, 62 S.
Ct. 1194, 1200, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1066, 1072 (1942). Secondly, the Commission twice provided for postponement of the effective date of the order with
respect to existing contracts and station licenses, and in regard to two of the
regulations the extension or suspension was "in order to permit the orderly disposition of properties." Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States,
supra, 62 S.Ct. at 1070, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) at 1198. Is this consistent with a
mere announcement of policy? Thirdly, the wording of the FCC's first draft of
the proposed regulations is significant. In its notice of November 28, 1940, which
ordered argument on the first draft, most of the regulations began, "No licensee
of a standard broadcast station shall enter into any contractual relation, express

or implied, wtih a network organization which.

.

. "

The final draft changed the

language to, "No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having
any contract

. . .

with a network organization which. . .

."

Brief for Appellant,

pp. 44, 45, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, supra.
"' See cases cited supra notes 30-34.
" Powell v. United States, 300 U. S.276, 57 S. Ct. 470, 81 L. ed. 643 (1937);
Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S. 382, 52 S. Ct. 440,
76 L. ed. 808 (1932); Western Pac. Cal. R. R. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U. S.
47, 52 S.Ct. 56, 76 L. ed. 160 (1931).
273 U. S.299, 47 S.Ct. 413, 71 L. ed. 651 (1927).
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bodies this decision and the means of enforcing it. The result is a
clash of interest between the network and the Commission which, the
principal case holds, may be resolved judicially through the procedure
of §402(a) of the Communications Act.
Nor is review barred by the "final order rule" precluding appeals
from interlocutory orders. The FCC's investigations, hearings and
deliberations have borne fruit in a legislative order which prescribes a
standard for future conduct. This integral part of the administrative
process has been concluded. What remains to be done is of a different
nature, i.e., the application of the standard to the individual cases as
they arise. Nothing in the law or the logic of this situation forces CBS
to await the second stage of the process before requesting judicial review. Indeed, it seems highly probable that any remedies available at
that stage would be most inadequate.5 4.
The Supreme Court has no desire to extend the holding of the
principal case to review all announcements of policy,5 5 but seeks rather
to limit it to cases where by the exercise of rule-making power an
administrative agency determines legal rights, and where appeal from
later administrative adjudication of those rights would not be efficacious
in the prevention of serious injury. In the words of Chief Justice
Stone: "The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in an
overrefined technique, but in the need.., to protect from the irreparable
injury threatened in the exceptional case by administrative rulings
which attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other...
adjudications that may follow, the results of which the regulations
purport to control." 56
WALLACE C. MURCHISON.

*Appellantes affadavits state that it knows of no affiliated station which is
prepared to contest the order; the stations have seemingly elected to comply with
the FCC's regulations even if it means rescinding their contracts with CBS. Brief
for Appellant, pp. 27-30, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States,
- U. S. -, 62 S.Ct. 1194, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1060 (1942). Even if one or
more stations did contest, the issues and effect of such proceedings would not be
the same as those in review under §402(a) of the Communications Act, 48 STAT.
1093 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. §402(a) (Supp. 1941), and the decision would probably come too late to save Columbia from serious injury. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. United States, supra, 62 S.Ct. at 1203, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) at

1075.

G' For the various forms which such announcements may take, see Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941)
26, 27.
" Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, -U. S.-, 62 S.Ct.
1194, 1204, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1060, 1076 (1942).

